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Conclusion
An analysis of workers’ rights under the EU
Directive on takeover bids 
Jan Cremers and Sigurt Vitols
The chapters in this book cover much ground and indicate significant
variation between countries regarding the strength of the rights that
workers have in takeover situations. The company case studies also
indicate wide variation in the degree to which workers can defend their
interests in such situations. Despite this heterogeneity, some common
themes and general conclusions can be drawn. 
1. The Takeover Bids Directive is based on an incorrect
economic premise 
As reviewed in the Introduction and in Chapter 1 of this book, a major
assumption underlying the Takeover Bids Directive is that takeovers are,
on the whole, positive for the economy and employment. On that basis, it
is in the interests of Europe to encourage takeovers and the restructuring
activity they involve. This premise supposedly provides a key justification
for the existence of this Directive. 
However, in the reviews of studies on the impact of takeovers on
employment and value creation, presented in the chapters by Schenk and
Pendleton, no hard evidence can be found for a naturally occurring
positive contribution to the economy and the labour market. Many, if not
most takeovers appear to result in a net reduction in value creation and
employment losses, at least in the short run. These negative effects are
strongest in the case of ‘hostile’ takeovers. Therefore, it can be concluded
that the optimistic view of the economic benefits of takeovers underlying
the Takeover Directive must be qualified, reconsidered and rethought.
The wavelike nature of takeovers, with the bulk of takeovers taking place
in the ‘speculative’ phase of the financial market cycle, indicates the strong
connection between takeovers and exuberant financial markets. It
appears that companies are strongly motivated to emulate their peers and
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that executives under such circumstances have an incentive to build up
corporate empires rather than to pursue the genuine goals of the firm.
The logic of many takeovers appears to be driven by the logic of financial
markets, rather than the long-term interests of firms and their
stakeholders.
The deviation from reality of this key assumption indicates the necessity
for taking a fresh look at the Directive and its justification. First, a much
more cautious attitude should be taken towards takeovers and the
desirability of encouraging them, particularly in the case of hostile
takeovers. A less critical view of takeover defences should be taken.
Secondly, the rights of stakeholders (including workers) to protect
themselves from the negative effects of takeovers should be strengthened. 
2. Worker rights in the Takeover Bids Directive come
too late in the process
As discussed at length in this book, the Takeover Bids Directive requires
management to inform workers in the target company once the takeover
bid has been made; specifically, they are entitled to receive a copy of the
offer document, which among other items has to include the anticipated
repercussions of the takeover on employment and production locations.
Furthermore, workers have the right to append their opinion to the
opinion that the management of the target company is supposed to send
to their shareholders (see Figure 1).
However, through the company case studies we can see that these
information rights are triggered at a late stage of the process. The key
features of the takeover bid have already been decided by the time the
offer document is made public and are difficult to influence at this stage.
Furthermore, workers’ opinion on the merits of the bid may have little
impact on the shareholders’ final decision, as shareholders in the target
company (particularly financial investors) generally have a stronger
incentive to ‘cash out’ by accepting the large premiums typically involved
in takeovers than to resist an offer that is not in the long-run interests of
the company. 
Through the country and company case studies in this book we see that
workers in countries with strong works councils (for example, the
Netherlands) and/or board level employee representation (for example,
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Denmark, Sweden, Norway) are better able to intervene at an early stage
of the takeover process. Early information, consultation and
codetermination mean being involved before management makes a final
decision, that is, at a stage when workers can still have a significant
influence on the decision. Several of these stronger national rights,
however, cannot be derived from the Takeover Bids Directive. 
A more challenging situation is where a transfer of ownership is agreed
between the controlling shareholders of two companies and management
is completely bypassed. The reality in such cases is that takeovers are
effectively a ‘done deal’ before the formal takeover bid has been made.
The chapter on Austria, for example, shows that worker representatives
have only used their right of opinion once. Although Austria is a
somewhat extreme example because most listed companies have a
controlling shareholder, many other European member states, including
the most advanced, have seen a significant rise in concentrated
(institutional) shareholding over recent decades. In other words, even in
countries where workers have strong rights, labour law typically is limited
to the relationship between workers and management, not between
workers and investors. 
Workers should be involved at an early stage in the takeover process,
when discussions within the bidder company or between the potential
bidder and management of the target company are developing. This right
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Figure 1 Stages in the takeover process 
In EU takeover bids directive, worker rights…
… are focused here …
1.  Oerer (bidder) management considers takeover
5.  Review by merger authorities (possibly)
4.  Shareholder deliberation (possible competing bids, public debate/discussion)
2.  Oerer management approaches oeree management (typically)
3.a.  Takeover bid reviewed by regulator (in some countries)
3.b.  Formal takeover bid (in oer document) made to shareholders
should not be limited to the worker–management relationship but should
also apply to potential owning shareholders/investors. This would allow
workers to better protect their interests by giving them greater influence
in the takeover process. 
3. Worker rights in the Takeover Bids Directive neglect
workers employed by the acquiring company
(bidder)
Worker rights in the Directive are focused on workers in the target
company, specifically on allowing workers in the target company to
append an opinion to the report that managers send on to shareholders
in the target company. However, employment and economic impacts are
frequently more negative in the acquiring company than in the bidder
company. Workers in the acquiring company should therefore have strong
involvement rights at an early stage in the takeover process. 
4. Confidentiality requirements should be revised to
respect labour law 
The country framework analyses show that in some countries
(Netherlands, Finland) there is an explicit conflict between the timing
requirements in securities law and rights in labour law regarding
information on takeovers. Frequently, securities law or corporate
governance rules see this as ‘insider information’ which should be treated
with confidentiality. Two of the company case studies (Denmark and
Finland) showed that worker board-level representatives did not share
their early knowledge of impending takeovers with other worker
representatives; this was due to fears about legal liability for passing on
confidential information.
As described in the Introduction to this book, however, there are plenty of
illustrations of provisions in labour law that allow worker representatives
to effectively coordinate with other worker representatives. One example
is the transferring of confidentiality requirements to other worker
representatives receiving the information, for example, in the case of
European Works Councils. Confidentiality requirements need to be revised
so that they do not restrict the exercise of worker rights. 
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5. Worker rights in the Takeover Bids Directive lack
effective sanctions
The country studies show that there is a massive difference between the
penalties imposed for breaching securities law and labour law. The
substantial penalties that can be imposed for violating aspects of
securities law stand in stark contrast with the minimal or non-existent
penalties for not respecting commitments made on employment or
production location in takeover bids.
Perhaps the best known case, the Kraft/Cadbury takeover treated in
Chapter 16, shows that the Takeover Bids Directive lacks effective sanctions
when the bidder violates explicit promises regarding employment and
production in the bid document. Also, statements in the bid document are
often quite vague, stating for example that management ‘does not
anticipate’ negative impacts on employment. In the United Kingdom, after
the Cadbury situation, trade unions and other stakeholders have demanded
that management statements on takeover impacts must be specific and
should be legally binding for a set period after the takeover.
6. Merger regulations do not adequately take into
account the impact on workers/worker rights 
Merger authorities also have a say in allowing or disallowing takeovers.
However, the merger rules in the EU and in many Member States are
focused on the competition impact (market shares, market prices) of
mergers but not on their broader economic impact. Workers and other
stakeholders may have a right to attend hearings and express their
opinion, but issues such as employment impact are not allowed to play a
role in the merger authorities’ decisions. Since mergers that are big
enough to require approval by the authorities are, however, likely to have
a more significant economic impact outside the competition domain, the
decisions of merger authorities should explicitly consider a merger’s
impact on systemic issues such as economic stability, employment and
ESG factors. Besides, in a fair number of cases, the authorities require
merging parties to apply so-called remedies before allowing the merger
to pass, again with a view to competitive effects only. The competition
effectiveness of such remedies has recently been questioned, however. For
employees, remedies mostly imply that the merging parties have to spin-
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off subsidiaries, thus potentially disrupting, and diminishing, employee
engagement. Consequently, the use of remedies must be reconsidered. 
7. A well-balanced revision of the Takeover Bids
Directive is sorely needed 
In summary, the six points listed above constitute a strong critique of the
Takeover Bids Directive and an argument for its revision. The analysis of
country legal frameworks and actual cases of company takeovers show
that the balance of power in corporate governance and company law is
tipped too much in the direction of shareholder power. This is not in the
long-term interests of companies nor of the European economy and
society in general. Company law and corporate governance in the area of
takeovers – as well as in other areas – needs to be revised to create a better
balance between the interests of shareholders, workers and other
stakeholders. The positive experiences, based on more extensive national
workers’ rights, that can be found in some of the contributions of this book
can serve as guidelines for a progressive revision that introduces a timely
and early warning, a more serious effort to consult workers from both the
acquirer and the target company, a rights-based involvement of workers
and the introduction of effective and dissuasive sanctions. 
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